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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
This matter comes on before this court on an appeal from 
an order entered on September 30, 1998, enforcing a 
settlement decree. The background of the case is as follows. 
In 1988, the United States sued the State of New Jersey, 
the New Jersey Department of Personnel and the New 
Jersey Commissioner of Personnel under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq., alleging 
that the State had violated the federal civil rights of women 
and minorities seeking state entry-level law enforcement 
positions by using written and physical performance 
examinations that had a discriminatory impact on these 
groups and did not significantly serve legitimate business 
goals. In an amendment to its complaint, the United States 
extended the charges of discrimination to include the hiring 
of county and municipal entry-level law enforcement 
officers as well as state correction officer recruits. The 
district court eventually consolidated the United States' suit 
with discrimination cases brought by individual plaintiffs 
Armadina Tahaney, Donna Roman, Mary Vasquez, Cecilia 
Shinn and Carrie Reed against the State and the City of 
Newark. 
 
In March 1995, the United States and the State entered 
into a consent decree, which the district court approved, to 
settle the litigation. The State did not admit any 
 
                                3 
  
wrongdoing in the decree and instead expressly denied that 
it had engaged in the discriminatory hiring practices the 
United States asserted. The State did agree, however, to use 
non-discriminatory criteria in selecting law enforcement 
officers and to discontinue the use of certain employment 
tests. 
 
As significant here, the consent decree established 
procedures for ascertaining the alleged victims of 
discrimination entitled to relief. Eligible individuals received 
back pay from a $6,500,000 fund, and a retroactive 
pension benefit, subject to a $625,000 cap on the total 
amount the State would pay. Additionally, the State was to 
place eligible individuals on certification lists for 
appointment to designated law enforcement positions as 
those positions became available. Eligible women and 
minorities appointed to state positions received a"remedial 
seniority date" based on the date they would have been 
hired but for the State's alleged discrimination. 1 Most 
importantly for the purposes of this appeal, the decree 
provided that those individuals who were hired were 
entitled to "all the emoluments of the job title to which they 
are appointed, including full retroactive seniority and the 
extent of pension credit provided under P 29[of the 
decree]." (Emphasis added.) The court retained jurisdiction 
to implement the decree. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
The United States moved to enforce the decree in the 
district court in February 1998, claiming that the State was 
violating its terms by failing to provide retroactive salary 
"step-increases" to the alleged victims of discrimination it 
had hired. In New Jersey, state agencies determine a state 
law enforcement officer's salary on a nine-step 
compensation schedule. Normally, officers are promoted to 
the next step for every year of satisfactory service, and, as 
a result, an officer's salary increases with seniority until the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The decree did not provide retroactive seniority relief to applicants 
for 
county and municipal positions because providing such relief would have 
required joining as parties approximately 280 county and municipal civil 
service jurisdictions that would have been obligated to bear the costs 
associated with such seniority. 
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highest step is reached. The United States claimed that the 
salary of individuals hired under the decree should reflect 
the number of step increases that they would have received 
based on their determined date of hire, the "remedial 
seniority date." 
 
The State disagreed. It argued that it was inappropriate 
to award salary increases for years of satisfactory service 
when the beneficiaries of the increases had not performed 
satisfactory service or, indeed, any service at all during the 
years. The State further argued that the term "seniority" in 
the consent decree referred only to seniority for purposes of 
promotions, benefits and layoffs but not for purposes of 
salary. In support of its position, the State submitted an 
affidavit from Douglass L. Derry, a senior deputy attorney 
general who had negotiated the decree on the State's 
behalf. The affidavit stated in relevant part:"It was the 
State's understanding that retroactive seniority would be 
given to priority hires in terms of their rights under New 
Jersey civil service law, that is for use in promotions, 
benefits and layoffs. I did not agree on behalf of the State 
to provide salary increases as part of retroactive seniority." 
The United States did not submit an affidavit contradicting 
Derry's statements. 
 
In an opinion dated September 29, 1998, the district 
court granted the United States' motion to enforce the 
consent decree and ordered the State to award retroactive 
step increases to individuals hired under the decree. 
Treating the decree as a contract, the court indicated that 
its terms were not ambiguous, and thus its plain language 
controlled. The court stated that the only limitation on the 
terms "full seniority" and "emolument" in the decree was 
the phrase "and the extent of retroactive pension credit 
provided under P 29 [of the decree]." Applying the 
interpretative maxim of expressio unis est exclusio alterius 
(the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other), 
the court concluded that the only limitation in the decree 
on seniority benefits was the capping of pension payments. 
Thus, the court reasoned that the decree's terms covered 
salary raises associated with seniority. Inasmuch as step 
increases in New Jersey are essentially automatic, the court 
found little reason to conclude that the decree's 
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beneficiaries should not receive such increases 
retroactively, particularly as those awarded permanent law 
enforcement positions under the decree were required to 
complete a "working test period" that allowed the State to 
evaluate their job performance. The court therefore held 
that the decree's plain language, when considered in light 
of New Jersey practices, provided for retroactive salary 
increases. 
 
The district court made two additional points in its 
opinion that supported its result. First, it noted that in case 
law the term "retroactive seniority" traditionally connotes 
seniority for purposes of determining salary, and thus the 
parties must have intended to include salary increases 
when they used that term in the decree. Second, it stated 
that, all other interpretative factors aside, it had explained 
in its opinion approving the decree that merit increases 
were included in the remedial seniority to which the hired 
individuals were entitled. Thus, the court ruled that the 
State had to live up to the promises made in the decree and 
ordered it to award the salary increases to the eligible 
individuals. Accordingly, it entered the order of September 
30, 1998, from which the State has appealed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We are exercising plenary review of this appeal. See 
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 
1998). The district court had original jurisdiction under 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-6(b), 28 U.S.C. S 1343(a), and 28 U.S.C. 
S 1345, and we have jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 or 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) to review the district 
court's interlocutory order granting the United States' 
motion to enforce a previously entered consent decree. See 
Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Initially we set forth a court's function in interpretating a 
consent decree. As we indicated in Harris,"[w]e discern the 
scope of a consent decree by examining the language within 
its four corners." Harris, 137 F.3d at 212 (citing United 
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91 S.Ct. 
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1752, 1757 (1971)); see also Farley v. Philadelphia Hous. 
Auth., 102 F.3d 697, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasizing 
importance of focusing on decree's language rather than on 
court's notion of its purpose). "In so doing, we must not 
strain the decree's precise terms or impose other terms in 
an attempt to reconcile the decree with our own conception 
of its purpose." Harris, 137 F.3d at 212. Further, as 
consent decrees have many of the attributes of contracts, 
we interpret them with reference to traditional principles of 
contract interpretation. See Fox v. United States Dep't of 
Hous. and Urban Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(citing United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 
223, 236-38, 95 S.Ct. 926, 932-35 (1975)). Thus, resort to 
extrinsic evidence is permissible, but only when the decree 
itself is ambiguous, although circumstances surrounding 
its formation are always relevant to its meaning. See Fox, 
680 F.2d at 319-20. Whether extrinsic evidence is required 
to interpret a consent decree is itself a question of law 
subject to plenary review. See id. at 320. Our first task in 
interpreting a consent decree, therefore, is to determine 
whether its terms unambiguously cover the dispute in 
question. See id. 
 
In addressing the question of ambiguity, our focus 
remains on the contractual language itself, rather than on 
the parties' subjective understanding of the language. See 
In re Unisys Corp., 97 F.3d 710, 715 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 
1009 (3d Cir. 1980)). The parties are bound by the 
"objective definition of the words they use to express their 
intent," including the specialized meaning of any legal 
terms of art. See Unisys, 97 F.3d at 715. Thus, a provision 
in a decree is ambiguous only when, from an objective 
standpoint, it is reasonably susceptible to at least two 
different interpretations. See Hullet v. Towers, Perrin, 
Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The contractual phrase at issue in this case provides that 
candidates who are appointed to state jobs under the 
decree will receive "all the emoluments of the job title to 
which they are appointed, including full retroactive 
seniority and the extent of pension credit provided under 
P 29 [of the decree]." Applying the case law described above, 
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our first step is to determine whether this phrase is 
ambiguous in light of the context in which the decree was 
signed and the specialized meaning of any words used. We 
conclude that regardless of the perspective from which we 
consider the decree's language, its terms unambiguously 
guarantee to its beneficiaries a salary that includes 
retroactive step increases. 
 
As the United States points out, the word "emolument" is 
defined to include salary received from employment. See 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 742 (1986). 
Thus, the plain language of the decree provides to 
beneficiaries the salary associated with their job title, 
including "full retroactive seniority." The State does not 
dispute that seniority is a factor in determining the salary 
of state employees in the positions involved here, for it 
recognizes that the State awards salary step increases 
based on each year of satisfactory service and thus the 
increases are essentially automatic. See Supp. App. 86 
(statement by New Jersey's counsel at oral argument that 
as "a practical matter," there are "very few" individuals who 
do not receive the step increase). Given this factual context, 
the decree's guarantee of a salary that includes full 
retroactive seniority is reasonably susceptible to only one 
meaning: that beneficiaries will receive the same salary as 
other employees with the same seniority date.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Our result here is not inconsistent with our recent opinion in Fultz v. 
Dunn, 165 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2342 (1999), 
which involved the calculation of seniority in the implementation of a 
settlement agreement of earlier litigation providing for reemployment of 
a terminated employee. There we held that the terminated employee 
could not be successful in a First Amendment retaliation action 
challenging the seniority calculation because the applicable state 
regulations required the challenged calculations. We also indicated that 
the reemployed employee "did not bargain for recognition of seniority 
based on his terminated employment in the settlement agreement." Id. at 
219. Thus, if the defendant in Fultz had invented a term to recapture the 
plaintiff 's seniority, "he would have been giving [him] more than he 
bargained for when he came to an agreement" settling the underlying 
action. Id. at 221. Here the situation is different, as the order of 
September 30, 1998, merely gave the beneficiaries of the consent decree 
the benefits agreed upon. 
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Considering the phrase "full retroactive seniority" in 
isolation leads to the same result. This phrase is a term of 
art that the Supreme Court discussed in Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976). In 
Franks, the Court ruled that Title VII permits an award of 
retroactive seniority to individuals who had not been hired 
because of discrimination. See id. at 779-80, 96 S.Ct. at 
1271-72. In its opinion, the Court used the term 
"retroactive seniority" to describe both "competitive" 
seniority, which is used to allocate scarce resources such 
as promotions and retentions, and "benefit" seniority, which 
assigns non-competitive benefits that are tied to years of 
service, such as pensions, vacations and salary. See id. at 
766-67, 96 S.Ct. at 1265; see also United States v. City of 
Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1998) (including 
compensation based on employee's "longevity" in definition 
of benefit seniority). When the Supreme Court wished to 
distinguish between the two types of seniority, it did so 
specifically. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 773 n.33, 96 S.Ct. at 
1268 n.33. Based on the established meaning of 
"retroactive seniority," the only reasonable interpretation of 
the decree's provision for "full retroactive seniority" is that 
it encompasses both types of seniority, competitive and 
benefit. See ITT Continental, 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 
935 (stating that in interpreting a decree's language, it is 
appropriate to consider "any technical meaning words used 
may have had to the parties"). Because in New Jersey an 
employee's seniority does determine the salary benefit, we 
interpret the decree to include the salary step increases.3 
 
The context in which the district court entered the decree 
provides additional support for interpreting it to guarantee 
beneficiaries retroactive step increases in their salaries. In 
its comprehensive opinion approving the consent decree 
after a fairness hearing, the district court stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. At oral argument before us, the State argued that we must ascertain 
the parties' intent in coming to the settlement and agreeing upon the 
disputed provision. We agree with that contention and thus we do not 
doubt that if it could be demonstrated that the parties did not intend a 
term of art to have the meaning that it had in another context, their 
intent should be honored. The State's problem is that it did not make 
that showing. 
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"Retroactive seniority was not provided for persons who 
applied for county and municipal jobs, in part, because 
providing such relief would have required joining as parties 
and reaching settlement with approximately 280 county 
and municipal civil service jurisdictions that would have 
borne the costs associated with retroactive seniority, e.g., 
salary increases and benefits based on years of service." 
(Emphasis added.) This statement clearly demonstrates the 
court's understanding that the retroactive seniority 
provided in the decree extended to salary increases. 
Further, in discussing the objections made by individuals 
at the fairness hearing to the seniority granted in the 
decree, the court noted that most objections did not relate 
to "benefit" seniority, such as "merit increases," but to 
"competitive" seniority, such as the order of promotions or 
layoffs. Thus, the court again highlighted its understanding 
that merit increases were part of the retroactive seniority 
awarded to individuals hired under the decree. Neither of 
the parties objected to the court's comments. Given these 
statements in the district court's opinion, the 
circumstances surrounding the formal entry of the decree 
also point to interpreting the phrase "full retroactive 
seniority" to include retroactive step increases. 
 
The State's attempts to inject ambiguity into the decree's 
language are unconvincing. The State first claims that step 
increases cannot be imposed retroactively because the 
decree does not provide specifically for such increases. This 
argument, however, is not persuasive. The decree also does 
not provide specifically for vacation time based on the 
retroactive seniority date, but New Jersey does not dispute 
that appointees hired under the decree are entitled to such 
benefits. The State's claim that the decree provides for 
some types of seniority benefits but not others is not 
supported by the decree's language. The decree states that 
beneficiaries will receive "full retroactive seniority;" the only 
exception to "full" seniority benefits in the decree is the cap 
on pension benefits in paragraph 29 of the decree. Thus, 
there is no basis in the decree's terms for distinguishing 
between types of seniority benefits other than pension 
benefits. 
 
The State next contends that salary increases are not 
part of seniority because they are not an entitlement; 
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instead, it claims that the State awards increases only after 
successful completion of years of service. As we explained 
above, however, the State conceded at oral argument in the 
district court that as a practical matter it rarely denies step 
increases to state employees. It did not retreat from that 
position on this appeal. See also County of Bergen, 23 N.J. 
Pub. Employee Rep. P 28017 (1996) (describing step 
increases that are "based only upon the satisfactory 
completion of another year of service" as "automatic"), 
recommendation of dismissal adopted, 23 N.J. Pub. 
Employee Rep. P 28136 (1997). Clearly, then, the district 
court correctly determined that in New Jersey, a step 
increase is an entitlement that automatically accrues with 
seniority. See Galloway Township Bd. of Ed. v. Galloway 
Township Ed. Ass'n, 393 A.2d 218, 230-32 (N.J. 1978). 
 
Moreover, as the district court pointed out, the State has 
no reason to conclude that individuals hired under the 
decree would be those unusual employees who performed 
their jobs unsatisfactorily. All individuals who received 
permanent employment offers under the decree first had to 
complete a "working test period." Under New Jersey law, 
this period is "a part of the examination process. . . during 
which time the work performance and conduct of the 
employee is evaluated to determine if permanent status is 
merited." N.J. Admin. Code tit. 4A, S 1-1.3 (1999). Thus, the 
individuals employed demonstrated an ability to perform 
their jobs adequately. There is therefore no reason based on 
the record to conclude that the beneficiaries of the decree 
should be denied the step increases that they would have 
received if they had been hired on their retroactive seniority 
dates. 
 
Next, the State argues that awarding the step increases 
would violate the parties' agreement in the decree limiting 
the State's monetary liability to $6.5 million in back pay 
and $625,000 in pension benefits. According to the State, 
this $7.125 million sum was the only monetary 
compensation that it agreed to pay; therefore, it claims that 
awarding retroactive step increases would violate the 
decree. In fact, however, the State did agree to pay 
additional funds to the decree's beneficiaries in the form of 
salaries to those hired, and it is not claiming that salaries 
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without the step increases are "extra" compensation. 
Because the United States merely is protesting the amount 
of salary paid rather than requesting additional funds for 
purposes other than salary, interpreting the decree to 
require a salary that reflects the retroactive seniority date 
would not violate the consent decree's terms. 
 
The State also contends that the district court 
erroneously ignored its undisputed evidence in Derry's 
affidavit that the State never intended to provide retroactive 
step increases to individuals hired under the consent 
decree. But as the United States correctly points out, the 
district court could not consider such evidence once it 
determined that the decree's language was clear. Our case 
law plainly establishes that a court can consult extrinsic 
evidence in interpreting a consent decree only when the 
language of the decree is ambiguous. See Fox, 680 F.2d at 
319. When the decree's language is not reasonably 
susceptible to two different meanings, the court must 
determine the parties' intent from the language itself, not 
by the subjective impressions of the parties. See Hullett, 38 
F.3d at 111. Thus, the district court correctly refused to 
consider the affidavit given the lack of ambiguity in the 
decree's terms. 
 
The same analysis befalls the State's claim that the 
district court should have interpreted the language of the 
decree against its drafter, the United States. Like extrinsic 
evidence, courts turn to this interpretative aid only after 
concluding that a document's terms are ambiguous. See In 
re Nelson Co., 959 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Thus, the court did not err by failing to invoke this 
principle of contract interpretation. In this regard, we point 
out that the State is a sophisticated litigant that at the time 
of the settlement was dealing with its own procedures and 
regulations. In these circumstances, we question whether a 
court should place much weight on a contention that it 
should interpret the document at issue against its drafter. 
 
Finally, we reject the State's argument that the decree 
cannot be interpreted to provide for retroactive step 
increases as such increases would violate a state 
administrative regulation. The New Jersey Administrative 
Code provides that a new employee may be placed at no 
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higher than the fourth step of the salary range for his or 
her title. See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 4A,S 3-4.4 (a) (1999). 
Because some of the individuals hired under the decree had 
retroactive seniority dates more than four years in the past, 
providing them with retroactive step increases would have 
required New Jersey to place them at higher than the 
fourth step of the relevant salary range. The State argues 
that it would not have agreed to violate its own regulation 
in this manner without declaring its intent to do so 
explicitly in the decree. 
 
As the United States points out, however, individuals 
hired under the decree were not "new employees" in the 
sense intended by the regulation. The regulation states that 
a new employee "is one who has had no immediate prior 
State service with that appointing authority." Id. But the 
beneficiaries of the decree were deemed, for most intents 
and purposes, to have been hired in the past. The United 
States therefore contends that individuals hired under the 
decree should receive the salary that correlates to the years 
of service assumed by their retroactive seniority date. Thus, 
to rule in favor of the United States' position requires only 
paying the appointees under the decree the same salary as 
other individuals with an equal number of "years" on the 
job. We do not regard this interpretation as violating the 
administrative regulation highlighted by the State. 4 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum we therefore reject all of the State's arguments for 
finding ambiguity in the consent decree. Instead, we 
conclude that the district court correctly held that the 
consent decree, by guaranteeing "full retroactive seniority" 
to those hired, unambiguously guaranteed to them 
retroactive salary increases that accompany seniority under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Even though we conclude that the decree is unambiguous, and thus 
no hearing to consider extrinsic evidence was necessary, we note that 
the State may have waived the right to request such a hearing in any 
case. At oral argument before the district court, the State's attorney 
passed on the court's offer to hold a hearing if counsel felt that the 
decree was ambiguous. The State's attorney instead replied: "I'm not 
sure that I'm arguing that it's an ambiguous contract." 
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New Jersey procedures. Accordingly, the order of September 
30, 1999, will be affirmed. 
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